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"profession," "expertise").^ For centuries afterward, this question was regularly, and at times furiously, disputed. Indeed, it was pivotal in shaping the "old quarrel" between rhetoric and phUosophy that has figured so prominentiy in the history of western thought. If Plato's Socrates began this quarrel by accusing rhetoric oiatechnia ("artiessness") in the Gorgias, the most recent retort was probably offered by Brian Vickers in his In Defence of Rhetoric, some fifty pages of which is devoted to rebutting Socrates' charges.^ My title is unoriginal in a second sense: in 1986, Jonathan Barnes pubUshed a masterful essay, "Is Rhetoric an Art?", in which he offered an overview of the debate as it took place in antiquity. Barnes focuses mainly on Sextus Empiricus, who argues that rhetoric is not an art, and Quintilian, Cicero, and PhUodemus, who argue that it is. In discussing these authors he says, "There are the closest similarities among these texts, and it is plain that they are all drawing on a common stock." According to Barnes, ttiis "common stock" of arguments can be traced back to Carneades, Critolaus, and Diogenes working in the middle of the second century B.C.E., and then back to the seminal works, the Gorgias and (probably) Aristotle's Gryllus.'^ Apparently unknown to Barnes, Harry Hubbell had reached many of the same conclusions in the "Excursus" to his translation of "The Rhetorica of Philodemus." Here he surveys several of the same passages from these same four authors-Philodemus, Cicero, Quintilian, and Sextus Empiricus-and, like Barnes, concludes, "A comparison of the arguments used by our four authorities wUl reveal that they drew from common sources, some of wtiich can be identified, but most of which must be classed as part of a store of commonplaces which were famihar to all educated people."^ the Gorgias at 386.
-1 will use "techne" to translate the Greek techne, and "art" as a translation of flrs. I have titled this essay with the latter because it is more familiar than the former. Because my argument ultimately hinges on Greek texts, "techne" will actually be my preferred term throughout. '(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) , pp. 85-143.
••DARG Newsletter, 2 (1986), 2-22. The quotation is on p. 4. Further references to this article will appear in the text.
^"The Rhetorica of Philodemus," in Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920), p. 368. WhUe Barnes and HubbeU have successfully demonstrated the extraordinary persistence, as well as the frequently repeated patterns, of this debate throughout antiquity, their work requires elaboration. First, neither comments at sufficient length about the foundational roles of Isocrates and Plato in instigating and setting the terms of this question. Second, and more importantly, neither Barnes nor HubbeU offers any real insight into the possible significance of tfiis debate. In other words, they do not explain why it could possibly matter whether rhetoric is a techne or not. Barnes describes his topic as "interesting" mainly because he takes rhetoric to embrace not only public speaking, but public writing as weU. For him, the question boUs down to "Is there-or can there ever be-an organized body of knowledge, mastery of which wUl ground the abihty to write weU?" (p. 8). Ttiis matters because of the great proliferation, as weU as the sad quaUty, of writing today. HubbeU says only this about the significance of the question: "In aU its ramifications it is an interesting and ofttimes puzzling chapter in the history of human thought."* Both Barnes and HubbeU seriously understate the point. The purpose of this paper is to show why it really does matter whether or not rhetoric is a techne. There are at least two reasons. First, however it is ultimately defined, rhetoric is concerned with logos, with "civic discourse," the essential medium of human, poUtical, or "practical" Ufe.'' Second, to describe something as the subject matter of a techne is, even if impUcitly, to make an ontological claim. A techne (at least given a "standard" conception of it) is a determinate body of authoritative knowledge.* As a result, only a specific kind of entity, namely that with stable and inteUigible limits, i.e., which is itself determinate, is capable of receiving technical treatment.' When, in rhetoric, the object becomes logos, the techne-question strikes beyond the ontological, for it broaches ethical issues as weU: Does human, poUtical life have a fixed structure? Is it a determinate entity capable of becoming the province 'Ibid., p. 365 . 'George Kennedy subtities his translation of Aristotle's On Rhetoric, "A Theory of Civic Discourse" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). Hereafter I shall not italicize "logos."
*Exactiy what a techne is will be a critical point of contention in the debate to follow.
'For an excellent discussion of these features of techne see F. Heinimann, "Eine vorplatonische Theorie der Techne," Museum Helveticum, 18 (1961) , 105-30. 130 RHETORICA of a "technician?" Are rational, dependable procedures avaUable to determine how the life of logos should be Uved? Is there some expert (a technites) to whose judgments "laypeople" should defer? In sum, to what extent can human life be mastered and controlled by rational expertise?
These are questions aUve even today. Consider, for example, our many disagreements concerning the nature of "practical knowledge," or the human/social sciences. This paper does not aim to resolve such nagging debates. Instead, it will concentrate on the question itself. By discussing four pivotal moments in its fiistory, it wUl show how a seemingly arcane and academic question is actuaUy the source of rich and general controversy.
Section I sets the stage by briefly discussing the charge against rhetoric found in the Gorgias. Section II sketches the arguments of Sextus Empiricus and shows how they can be traced back to a single objection impUcit in the Socratic charge, namely that the putative subject matter of rhetoric is indeterminate. Section III reviews several arguments presented by QuintiUan, most of which can be usefuUy formulated as responses to Sextus. Section rV shows how QuintiUan in fact reflects a line of thought first presented by Isocrates in Against the Sophists.
As mentioned above, both sides of the techne-question were, in their basic outUne, set by 385 B.C.E., and, as Barnes and HubbeU have shown, the subsequent debate drew on a "common stock" of arguments. For this reason the organizing principle of this paper need not be ctironology. After beginning with Plato, it jumps to Sextus, and then works its way "backwards" to Isocrates. The purpose of the foUowing pages is, first, to articulate what exactly is common in tlvis "common stock" of arguments, and then to explain why it is an issue of intrinsic importance.
I
In the Gorgias, Socrates asserts that rhetoric is not a techne, but merely an empeiria and tribe, an empirical knack that produces gratification and pleasure (462a). Like cooking, it is a species of "flattery" and therefore has no "share in what is admirable":
AoKEi Toiwv HOI, U) Fopyia, elvai ri e7rtTi}8ev^a rexi'tKoi' JJLEV oii, 'I'vxfis 8e tTTOxacTTtK'^s Kai avSpeia^ Kai <j>vcTei Seii'TJs Trpoo-o/xiXeti' Tols avOpwTTOiS' Ka\(o 6E ocirrov ky(b TO KE<t>d\.at, ov KoXaKeiai'. ( [Rhetoric] seems to me, Gorgias, not to be a technical practice [epitedeuma technikon] , but instead a quaUty of an intuitive and manly soul, one that is clever by nature in dealing with human beings. In general, I caU it flattery.)i° (463a)
To explain exactly what flattery is, Socrates first states that both body and soul have an inherently good condition (euexia, 464a), both of which are stable enough to be securely known and towards which body and soul can each be moved. Foiur technai, medicine and gymnastic for the former, justice and legislation for the latter, know the good condition of their objects and can move them toward it. In contrast to these genuine technai, Plato (or vice versa) . Note the similarity between Plato's phrase, "intuitive (stochastikg) and manly (andreias) soul," and Isocrates' description of the good student of rhetoric as one with a "manly (andrikes) and intuitive {doxastikes) soul" (Against the Sophists §17). For a discussion of these two texts, see Dodds, Plato's Gorgias, p. 225 With these comments, the long battie between rhetoric and philosophy begins. The Socratic attack can be compressed into a smgle statement-rhetoric is not a techne-but, at least as formulated above, it seems to have two distinct prongs. Rhetoric, Socrates says, cannot give a logos of the aitia it claims as a subject matter: it is thus epistemicaUy deficient. Second, rhetoric aims for the pleasant, but not for the good: it is thus ethically degenerate as well.
These two distinct prongs of the attack, the epistemic and the ethical, no doubt were instrumental in shaping what became a widely used definition of techne. As Sextus Empiricus puts it, "every art is a body (sustema) consisting of items of knowledge which are mutually cohesive (ek katalepseon suggegumnasmenon) and having reference to one of the ends which are useful in life" (II. 10; the translation is from Barnes, pp. 5-6). Even if presented in specifically Stoic terminology, and thus not identical to what was stated in the Gorgias, this definition (which Barnes notes can be "found in a dozen other texts" [p. 6]) nevertheless reflects the two general conditions that Socrates imposes upon a techne: epistemic adequacy, expressed by Sextus as being an organized or cohesive body of knowledge, and ethical responsibiUty, i.e., being useful.
Note that in the Gorgias itself, Socrates makes no exphcit connection between these two conditions. In other words, he does not explain why rhetoric's epistemic deficiency leads or is equivalent to its moral degeneracy. Surely it is possible for any number of activities, say the simple act of walking, to be epistemicaUy deficient and thus unable to give an account of itself, without being morally reprehensible. The most likely, but impUcit, way of connecting the two prongs of the Socratic charge is to say that pleasure, the supposed aim of rhetoric, is intrinsically indeterminate. As Dodds puts it, what is pleasurable is not "determinable," for "likes and disUkes are not predictable."" Since a techne is a ^mato 's Gorgias, p. 229. rigorous and teachable form of knowledge with a determinate subject matter, rhetoric (as described by Socrates) cannot be a techne. J. C. B. GosUng makes much the same point: those emperiai that aim to please people "faU to be technai because no general account can be (or at least is) given of what pleases people, and so there are no general canons for ensuring success."^^ If these commentators are correct, then the two prongs of the charge coalesce: because its subject matter is pleasure, and because pleasure is indeterminate, rhetoric cannot be a techne. I shaU argue in the next section that, even if they are not formulated in exactly these terms, subsequent attacks against rhetoric, specificaUy those reported by Sextus, reflect precisely this Socratic objection.
II
Sextus denies rhetoric is a techne for the foUowing reasons: (1) Rhetoric is not a sustema ek katalepseon, for there can be no katalepsis of something that is false, and the rules of rhetoric are false. A typical assertion, e.g., that the orator ought to excite anger or pity in the judges at a trial, is not true and so cannot be apprehended. It is no more true, Sextus claims, that a rhetor should excite anger than it is that one ought to steal .'^ Barnes argues that "Sextus' argument rests on an elementary confusion: he faUs to distinguish between the technical 'ought' of the artist and the moral 'ought' of the preacher" (p. 13). Sextus thinks that just as there is a protiibition against stealing, and so it is false to say that one ought to steal, it is not true that one ought to excite anger or pity in the judges. WhUe there may be no moral obUgation to excite anger or pity, Sextus is wrong if "ought" is interpreted in a technical sense, for it may be perfectly true that in order to win a lawsuit orators should provoke judges to anger. As a result, Sextus faUs to show there is no truth for rhetoric to apprehend; he does not explain why rhetoric cannot compUe a "system" of instrumental rules on how to attain specific goals. Barnes is probably right: Sextus does seem to coUapse the moral into the epistemic by saying, in effect, that because the rules of rhetoric do not reflect moral obUgations, they are not true. Does he mean that if something is not moral, it cannot be true? Tliis would be very strange. Even if strange, however, it should be noted that this confused argument reproduces the two prongs of Socrates' attack against rhetoric in the Gorgias, namely the epistemic and the ethical. Socrates says that rhetoric is not a techne because it is alogon and because it aims for pleasure rather than the good. Sextus' complaint that rhetoric does not apprehend the truth dovetaUs with his objection that it is morally reprehensible. Even if neither explains it fully, both Sextus and Socrates, then, conceive of a link between the epistemic and ethical deficiencies of rhetoric.
(2) Rhetoric has neither a fixed (hestekos) telos, nor one that holds for the most part; therefore it is not a techne (11.13).^* Since a debate can have but one winner, and it is entirely possible that both participants in the debate are trained orators, rhetoric cannot achieve its end on a regular enough basis to qualify as a techne. Of course, the force of ttiis argument depends on how the telos of rhetoric is defined. If it is defined as persuasion (see II.61ff.), i.e., actually winning debates, then rhetoric does not regularly achieve its end. If, however, rhetoric is defined as the art of speaking well, as Quintilian will define it (see Section III below), then it is perfectly possible for the rhetor to attain the end of rhetoric and not win debates. As Barnes puts it, "success ... is not a defining feature of art and the artists; what matters is that their success, when it is achieved, is caused not by luck but by learning" (p. 13).
Tliis objection against the Ul-defined telos of rhetoric alludes to an old distinction between two kinds of techne. As early as Plato's Philebus, Socrates distinguished those technai that are precise and firm, typified best by arithmetic, and those that are less precise or "stochastic" (stochastike, 55e8) and whose results hold only for the most part, such as music (55e-56c). This division is not made fully explicit until Alexander of Aphrodisias, who formulates it in terms of the respective ends of the two different types of technai:
"At 11.88 this conclusion is stated even more strongly: because it has no telos at all, rhetoric does not exist. (For in these kinds of [stochastic] technai judgment does not emerge on the basis of the ends achieved, as it does in building and weaving and the rest of the productive technai. In these production occurs in aU cases according to the same well-defined and fixed methods, and it is not possible for their result to come about by chance. By contrast, in stochastic technai things do not entirely come about according to what the techne is for the sake of. And the cause of this is that they come about by chance and the methods through which the things coming about from these technai actuaUy do come about are not weU defined. Therefore, that which comes about from these kind of technai is not the end of the technai, as is the case in those technai wtiich come to be through weU-defined methods and which, apart from these methods, would not exist. For as I said, in this type of techne the function is the end and the sign that something has happened according to techne.) '' In certain technai, the end is identical to function. In other words, if the technites exercises the techne well, performs its function, then the end wiU be achieved. So, for example, if a carpenter does his work properly, we fully expect a house, the end of tiis activity, to be buUt. If, after his work is done, a carpenter has faUed to buUd a house, it is fair to accuse him of atechnia. By contiast, an orator may exercise his techne well, i.e., speak weU, and yet fail to win his case. Such failure does not, however, disquaUfy him from claiming a techne, since, given its stochastic character, the end of rhetoric is not identical to the function. Alexander's comments disclose the real issue lurking in this objection. Because the stochastic technai have a method neither "weU defined" nor "fixed," it is much more likely that chance wiU intrude upon them. A carpenter knows how to build a house, and regularly does so. By contrast, the rules of a stochastic techne are far less weU defined. Winning a debate, for example, may depend on the mood of the judges, and this is unpredictable. Sextus' objection (2) reaUy focuses on the same issue as that in (1): the subject matter of rhetoric. In (1), Sextus describes rhetoric as having no truth, and therefore no subject matter, to apprehend. In (2), when discussing the absence of a fixed or even a "for the most part" telos, the issue is once again the nature of the subject matter, namely speaking weU in the broadest possible sense. Is it a determinate and unified entity which is stable enough to be thoroughly mastered? Or are its apparent successes merely the result of chance? Sextus beUeves the latter, and concludes that it cannot be treated by a legitimate techne.^* It should be clear that Sextus' argument (as weU as Socrates') presupposes a certain conception of techne, i.e., one specificaUy not stochastic. But no warrant is offered for this presupposition. As a result, it wiU properly be chaUenged by the rhetoricians. In Sections III and FV, we shaU see that Quintilian does so expUcitly, Isocrates implicitly.
eni yap T&V TOIOVTOHV TBXV(OV OVK diro TO)V eTnyivofiBvmv Tskoyv
(3) The study of rhetoric is not a necessary condition for becoming a good rhetor. Demades, for example, was an uneducated boatman, but he stiU became an excellent orator. Therefore, rhetoric is not a techne (11.16-17) .
This argument has an "antistrophe": those who study rhetoric frequentiy faU to perform well in the courts and assembUes; therefore, rhetoric is not a techne (11.18-19) .
As he consistentiy does, Barnes objects to both halves of the argument. To the first he rejoins: "Sextus supposes that an end which is sometimes achieved without art is never achieved by art. . . . PhUodemus rightiy rejects this supposition" (p. 9). To the second, he says: "Possession of the art is not sufficient for success-you need a good voice and practical experience. FaUure on the part of the professors is due to their deficiency in the latter requirements; it does not indicate that rhetoric lacks the standing of an art" (p. 10).
i^See also 11.61-71.
The basic issue of (3), then, is teachabUity which, in turn, is essential to the basic Greek notion of a techne.^^ Aristotle, who so frequently gives voice to tiaditional notions, says the following: There is something precarious in the teaching of rhetoric. The best instruction may fail to produce the desired outcome: even the weU-trained student may get stage fright before a large audience. To prefigure the argument of Section FV below, and to cite its (i.e., Isocrates') primary example, this is in sharp contrast with the teaching of correct speUing (orthography). The alphabet is a paradigmaficaUy determinate object capable of being broken into discrete elements whose recombination is governed by clearly stated rules. As a result, its teaching or transmission process is mechanical and reUable, and so it has an extraordinarUy high rate of success: the vast majority of people learn how to spell correctly, and if there is faUure, blame is typicaUy placed on the student, not the teacher." By this standard, rhetoric falls short. Of course, it is hardly obvious that this standard is appropriate. Indeed, that it is not wUl be a pivotal move Isocrates wUl make.
(4) Rhetoric is not useful (11.20-42, 49 ). This argument begins by noting that cities do not typically expel practitioners of other technai, who are, after all, quite useful. They do, however, ac-'See note 9. i^On Aristotle's relationship to this hraditional notion, see M. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 95.
'This is not to imply that the rules for correct spelling had been regularized in antiquity. As Rosalind Thomas puts it, "it is a comparatively recent development in modern Europe for a country to try to maintain a single system of 'correct spelling,' and dictionaries are an essential tool for that." Still, as she points out, there was a conception, even if not uniform, of correct spelling. Bad speUing in graffiti, for example, was "often taken to show that the writer was particularly ill-educated or slow" (Oral Tradition and Written Records in Classical Athens [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989 ], p. 47).
tively attempt to rid themselves of those who practice rhetoric. The conclusion: rhetoric is not a techne (11.21-25) . Sextus then goes on to argue that if rhetoric is an art at all, it wUl be of use either to its possessor or to the cities, lUce the rest of the arts (11.26). It is, however, useful to neither, a thesis supported by arguments such as these: rhetoric injures its possessor because it makes him worried day and night about his batfles in the courts (11.30); it is useless to cities because it erodes respect for the laws (11.34-38). Furthermore, the orator can argue either side of a question and make the lesser argument the greater. As such, he engages in contradictory (enantia) speeches in which injustice inheres (11.47).
Barnes makes two criticisms. First, Sextus ignores the historical fact that on some occasions trained orators have, of course, benefited their cities. Second, he "reUes on the arbitiary stipulation that every art must have an end which is useful" (p. 9). In one sense, however, Sextus' argument is not arbitrary at all: his conception of a techne is derived from Plato's Gorgias and so reflects the Socratic coupling of ethical and epistemic objections in the attack on rhetoric.
(5) Sextus explicitly takes up the issue of subject matter {hule) at 11.48. Referring back to arguments made in Against the Grammarians (1.131), he states that since words do not exist, speech (logos) does not exist; since rhetoric is (or thinks that it is) about speech, it is in effect about nothing, and so itself does not exist. (See also 11.88.) Of all his arguments, this is the most clearly Pyrrhonist. As such, for our purposes it is of least interest. Nevertheless, once again it is obvious that the principal charge being levelled at rhetoric has to do with its subject matter.
To summarize: Sextus Empiricus brings five objections against the proposition that rhetoric is a techne. Like Socrates' charges in the Gorgias, they have both an ethical and an epistemic thrust. These two prongs can, however, be united. The putative subject matter of rhetoric-speaking weU in the broadest sense-is terribly difficult to idenfify and to analyze into discrete and manipulable parts. This is what leads Sextus to deny that it is a body of mutuaUy cohesive items of knowledge; this is what causes its teachabiUty to become questionable and what allows the untiained to excel and the well trained to fail; this is what makes its telos difficult to recognize. Finally, the problematic, i.e., indeterminate, character of rhetoric's subject matter leads to the charge that it is useless. The rhetorician can argue both sides of an issue; as such, his is a contiadictory logos that can be identified with no fixed and firm set of values.
Ill
QuintUian offers an extended defense of the thesis that rhetoric is an art. His argument has several parts which I wiU present as responses to Sextus' objections. To call them responses is, of course, not to make a historical claim, since QuintiUan preceded Sextus by some one hundred years. Again, however, if Barnes and Hubbell are right, then both writers are drawing from a "common stock" of arguments and chronology is not essential in determining the order in which their arguments are presented.
(1) While it is tiue that rhetoric deals with falsehoods, this does not disqualify it from being an art. This is because it deals with falsehoods knowingly. Hannibal, for example, deceived his enemy into thinking that he was in retieat, while he liimself knew the truth completely. "Item orator, cum falso utitur pro vero, scit esse falsum eoque se pro vero uti." ("SimUarly an orator, when he substitutes falsehood for the tiuth, is aware of the falsehood and of the fact that he is substituting it for the truth," II.xvU.20.)2o
(2) Rhetoric does have a telos which it can meet for the most part: speaking well. "Tendit quidem ad victoriam qui dicit; sed cum bene dixit, etiam si non vincat, id quod arte continetur effecit." ("The speaker aims at victory, it is tiue, but if he speaks weU, he has Uved up to the ideals of his art even if he is defeated," II.xvu.23.) As discussed above, by defining the end of rhetoric in ttiis manner, QuintiUan avoids being burdened with the fact of the tiained orator's failures.
(3) Rhetoric is teachable. QuintiUan acknowledges that some men are naturally talented and become orators without expUcit tiaining in rhetoric. Like Sextus, he cites the example of the boatman-orator Demades. But he disputes the inference that, because of cases like this, rhetoric is not an art. First, he makes the point that "omnia quae ars consummaverit, a natura initia duxisse" ("everything which art has brought to perfection originated in nature," II.xvU.9). In other words, even if someone has natural ^OMy text of Quintilian is the Loeb Classical Library edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), ti-anslated by H. E. Bufler. talent, the art of rhetoric perfects it. Next, he expresses some doubt that, in fact, Demades was actuaUy untrained in rhetoric (II.xvU.12). Even if he was, however, he continuaUy practiced speaking weU, for "continua dicendi exercitatio potuerit tantum quantuscunque postea fuit fecisse; nam id potentissimum discendi genus est" ("continuous practice in speaking was sufficient to bring him to such proficiency as he attained: for experience is the best of aU schools," II.xvU.12). Finally, Demades would have had even greater success had he studied rhetoric.^^ Nature is the raw material for art, and so, "in mediocribus quidem utrisque mains adhuc naturae credam esse momentum, consummatos autem plus doctrinae debere quam naturae putabo" ("the average orator owes most to nature, while the perfect orator owes more to education," II.xb<.2).
(4) Rhetoric, QuintiUan insists, is quite useful. Cicero, after aU, used it to crush the plots of CatUine. Even if it is often used badly, ttiis is no more a strike against it than the fact that eating sometimes makes us iU is a serious objection to food. Given QuintiUan's definifion of rhetoric as the art of speaking weU, "quem nos finem sequimur, ut sit orator in primis vir bonus" ("this impUes that an orator must be a good man"), and as a result, "utilem certe esse eam confitendum est" ("there can be no doubt about its usefulness," Il.xvi.ll). Indeed, since the power of reason is what distinguishes human beings from the other animals and is responsible for their survival, and since reason without speech is ineffectual, the power of speech is extiemely valuable/useful (Il.xvi. 13-19).
(5) The most critical argument is this: rhetoric does have a subject matter suitable for treatment by an art. And what is it? "Ego (neque id sine auctoribus) materiam esse rhetorices iudico omnes res quaecunque ei ad dicendum subiectae erunt." ("For my own part, and I have authority to support me, I hold that the subject matter [materia] of rhetoric is composed of everything that may be placed before it as a subject for speech," II.xxi.4.) QuintiUan anticipates that his description of rhetoric as being able to talk about "everything" wiU meet with objections.^ Indeed, it wiU ^^The Demades example is also cited by Philodemus. See Hubbell, "The Rhetorica," p. 371.
^Much of Quintilian's discussion takes up themes developed by Cicero in De oratore I and II. have to confront exactly the objection Socrates implicitly offers in the Gorgias, namely that "everything" is indeterminate whUe an art must have a determinate subject matter: "Hanc autem quam nos materiam vocamus, id est res subiectas, quidam modo infinitam modo non propriam rhetorices esse dixerunt. ..." ("But this subject matter as we caU it, that is to say the things brought before [the orator] has been criticized by some, at times on the grounds that it is unlimited [infinita] and sometimes on the ground that it is not peculiar to oratory, . . ." II.xxi.7.) An art requires a pecuUar subject matter in order to be distinguished from other arts, and this must be an object that is determinate rather than infinita. If the purview of rhetoric embraces any and every subject, if no specific object provides it with a pecuUar subject matter, it cannot, it seems, be an art. Or, in other words, someone with an art is an expert, and no one can be an expert in everything.
QuintiUan's resolution of this problem is to argue that his subject matter is not unhmited, not infinita, but multiplex ("multifold," II.xxi.8). He illustiates what he means through an analogy between rhetoric and four "minor" arts. Architecture embraces within it other arts and everything else that is useful for the purpose of buUding; engraving and sculpture work in different media (gold, sUver, ivory, etc.); finally, medicine deals with exercise, normaUy conceived as the field of the expert trainer, and diet, the province of the cook (II.xxi.8-11).
His point is that each of these four arts is like rhetoric in not having a determinate and unique subject matter. But Quintihan fails to make his case with these four examples. WhUe it is tiue that architecture is "architectonic" and so to it other buUding arts are subordinated, it nevertheless remains the case that the subject matter of architecture, i.e., buUding, even if complex, is determinate. SimUarly with engraving and sculpture. They represent the mastery of basic techniques that can be executed in various media. But the fact that the media differ in no way compromises the unity of these basic techniques. Finally, even if medicine infringes on the provinces of the trainer and the cook, its subject matter is stUl restricted to the health of the human body.
In short, each of these four arts is radically different from rhetoric which, unlike them, can talk about anything, and so QuintUian's argument by analogy seems problematic. There is, however, a sense in which this argument does indeed work. There are several anciUary arts about which architecture must be knowledgeable. The architect must, for example, know something about masonry. He need not be an expert mason, but he must know enough about masonry to be able to converse with and direct the mason who works for him. As we shall see below, this reading of the analogy is defensible.
QuintiUan asks, if rhetoric can talk knowledgeably about everything, does this imply that "omnium igitur artium peritus erit orator" ("the orator must be the master of aU arts," II.xxi.l4)? Surely this is an impossibly encyclopedic demand, although one that seems to have been made by Hippias and Cicero.^3 QuintUian, at least, rejects the notion that the orator has to know all the arts:
Sed mihi satis est eius esse oratorem rei de qua dicet non inscium. Neque enim omnes causas novit, et debet posse de omnibus dicere. De quibus ergo dicet? De quibus didicit. SimUiter de artibus quoque de quibus dicendum erit, interim discet; et de quibus didicerit dicet.
(I . regard it as sufficient that an orator should not be actuaUy ignorant of the subject on which he has to speak. For he cannot have knowledge of aU causes, and yet he should be able to speak on aU. On what then wUI he speak? On those which he has studied. SimUarly as regards the arts, he will study those concerning wtiich he has to speak, as occasion may demand [interim] , and wiU speak on those which he has studied.) (II.xxi. 14-15) This is the key passage. What the orator should know is not everything, but what to study and when to study it. So, for example, if the debate in the Senate is about foreign policy, the orator should know something about, say, naval technology. First of all, having such knowledge is required to meet the goal of persuasion. If the debate focuses on something about shipbuilding, the orator should learn enough to be able to speak effectively about shipbuilding. How much is enough? What it takes to avoid being "actually ignorant" and to "get the job done." But isn't it the case that the expert shipbuilder wUl speak better about shipbuUding than the orator? Only if the orator has not done his homework. If he has studied the subject at hand, he will do a better job representing the position than the shipbuilder himself. The orator must know how to take up any subject and quickly learn its rudiments, at least those relevant to presenting his case. Of course, this requires being able to distinguish what is relevant from what is not. fn this sense the orator is like the architect who masters what needs to be known about the ancUlary art of masonry. Again, the orator must do this not only to understand the issue at hand properly, but also to speak effectively. He should know how much technical material to incorporate into his speech. Too much wUl aUenate the audience; too Uttle wiU impress the audience with the speaker's ignorance. The orator should be prepared to study anything: "Equidem omnia fere credo posse casu aUquo venire in officium oratoris: quod si non accidet, non erunt ei subiecta." ("For my part I hold that practically aU subjects are under certain circumstances liable to come up for tieatment by the orator. If the circumstances do not occur the subjects wiU not concern him," II.xxi.19.)
The officium of the orator is almost everything; it is indefinite, for he should be able to respond appropriately to any number of circumstances, to learn enough about any given subject in order to speak effectively about it. In this sense, and only in this sense, namely knowing what to study and when, can it be said that the orator can talk knowledgeably about everything.
What is rhetoric according to QuintiUan? The art of speaking weU whose subject matter includes everything that people talk about in pubhc. Ultimately, then, the subject matter of rhetoric is oratio, or logos, understood in an extremely broad sense as the most basic medium of all poUtical life. Indeed, "oratio/logos" comes extiemely close to being political activity itself (which we might label "praxis"). QuintUian makes this point in two ways; first, by exphcitly describing rhetoric as a practical art (but one that draws on both theoretical and productive arts, Il.xviU). Like dancing, its end is realized not in knowledge alone, but in action. Second, he is confident that the good orator will be the good man (II.xx.4, 8-10 and, of course. Book XII).^^ i^ other words, he conceives of the project of rhetoric as thoroughly value laden. In sum, the subject matter of rhetoric is human poUtical or "logical" life m its entirety. This crucial point must be understood in order to appreciate what finaUy is at stake in the quesfion, is rhetoric an art? The foUowing two passages, the first from Aristotle's Politics and the second from Isocrates' Antidosis, are meant to clarify. (For in the other powers . . . we are in no respect superior to other Uving creatures; nay, we are inferior to many in swiftness and in strength and in other resources; but, because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the Ufe of wUd beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and laws and invented technai; and, generaUy speaking, there is no institution devised by man which the power of logos has not helped us to estabUsh. ... If I must sum up on this subject, we shaU find that nothing done with inteUigence is done without logos, but logos is the marshaU of aU actions and of thought and those must use it who have the greatest wisdom.)^* 257) Both of these passages suggest that logos is virtually coextensive with being human. It is what distinguishes us from the animals and makes us who we are. Aristofle puts this point in characteristically teleological terms. What makes the human animal unique is the abiUty to discuss what is right and wrong. It is just this abiUty to evaluate and to discuss such evaluations that makes us political animals; logos, according to Aristofle, is thus the essential constituent as weU as the medium of poUtical life.
Isocrates says something very similar, although he begins with a different emphasis, namely the abUity to persuade, and then closes by taking Aristofle's point even further. For him, all cultural achievements are permeated by logos, and there is nothing intelligent that is not logical. Again, logos, specifically about human values, is the lifeblood of all human institutions; it saturates every uniquely human action. In short, logos is co-extensive with praxis.^'' By describing the subject matter of rhetoric as "everything," QuintUian holds to a conception of logos which is similar to those of Aristotle and Isocrates. And this is why the question of whether rhetoric is an art has such force: taking a stand on it requires taking a stand on the nature of human, of poUtical, Ufe. Can praxis be rendered determinate? Can it be regulated by hard and fast rules? Can its disputes be adjudicated by the voice of authoritative expertise? In short, can it become the subject matter of an art? To couch this in more familiar terms, is a human (social, political) science possible? If so, a corresponding epistemological question emerges: Is the rigid and formal sense of techne to which both Socrates and Sextus appeal the only possible model of it? Or is a stochastic techne, a set of informal and flexible "rules of thumb" rather than of mechanical or systematic rules, a viable epistemic option?^* To ask these parallel sets of questions is, quite ^'This translation is by George Kennedy, in his The Art of Persuasion in Ancient Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 8-9.
^^See also Cicero, De oratore Il.xvi.68. 28My use of the phrase "rules of thumb" comes from Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), p. 316. The best discussion of the stochastic techne in antiquity is James Allen, "Failure and Expertise in the Ancient Conception of an Art," distributed by the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, April 1989. simply, to ask who we, as knowers, doers, and speakers, are.^'
To summarize: QuintUian stiuggles with the techne-question. Achieving technical mastery of everything is surely impossible.
But everything is what the orator must know. This means, however, that he must know what to study and when. He must know what is appropriate and relevant and how to "get the job done." ImpUcit within his response, then, is a claim about the nature of poUtical Ufe: no, it cannot be rendered fuUy determinate nor become a matter of hard and fast rules. It can only be mastered through a sensitive awareness of what is needed at the moment. It requires the abiUty to know what is appropriate. In ttiis sense, rhetoric should indeed be called an art.
To appreciate the coherence and force of this response, it is best to turn back to the author who, with Plato, initiated the whole debate: Isocrates.3° (I am amazed whenever I see these [sophists] setting themselves up as instructors of youth who faU to understand that they are applying the paradigm of a fixed [tetagmene] techne to a creative process. For who except them does not know that, on the one hand, the writing 2'Fish, when discussing what he terms "anti-formalism," which I would describe as a rejection of the Socratic formal model of techne, says 'once you start down the anti-formalist road, there is no place to stop" (Doing What Comes Naturally, p. 2). His essays begin by challenging formalism and "end by challenging everything else" (p. 6). In other words. Fish appreciates well the enormous implications that arise in reflecting upon the epistemic status of rhetoric.
'°In Section IV, I repeat certain arguments that I made originally in "Stanley Fish and the Old Quarrel Between Rhetoric and Philosophy," Critical Review, 5 (1992) , 225-46. of letters is stable and remains unchanged, so that we continuaUy and always use the same letters for the same purpose, whUe on the other hand, when it comes to speeches [logoi], the situation is exactly the opposite.)3i ( §12)
In this passage, Isocrates is probably criticizing the artium scriptores, those sophists who had written "handbooks" of rhetorical instiuction. It is possible that these works bore the title Rhetorike Techne (or Techne Ton Logon) and were probably systematic, and often mechanical, compendia filled with terminological distinctions and definitions.^^ Isocrates uses the example of correct spelling, or orthography, to iUustiate what he caUs a "fixed" techne, i.e., a rigorous and teachable form of knowledge that includes strict definitions and conceptual divisions of its subject matter, and that issues in hard and fast rules. The correct spelling of a word allows for no variation or interpretation, and therefore its teaching is a highly reliable process, which is a critical benchmark of techne (at least of the sort assumed by Sextus and Socrates). Aristotle, too, singles out orthography, in order to constiast it with what he calls "deliberation": (Concerning those sciences [epistemai] that are precise and selfsufficient, Uke 'orthography ' [grammata] , there is no deliberation; for we are not uncertain about how a word ought to be speUed.)^^ That orthography is paradigmatic of a fixed techne is due to the nature of its subject matter. The sounds of the human voice constitute a determinate entity, a continuum of sound that can be counted as a single epistemic unit and analyzed into parts (e.g., vowels, labials, palatals). These, in turn, can be be symbolized by written marks and then recombined in accordance with stiict rules to form meaningful units. It is for this reason that teaching correct 3iMy Greek text is the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959) .
^^Kennedy argues that the best surviving example of such a techne is the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, falsely attributed to Aristofle, but probably authored by Anaximenes. See The Art of Persuasion in Greece, p. 12. On the issue of the term rhetorike, see Edward Schiappa, "Did Plato Coin Rhetorike?" American Journal of Philology, 111 (1990 speUing is a rather mechanical task whose success rate is extremely high. By contrast, and as noted (damningly) by Sextus and (approvingly) by Quintilian, the success rate in rhetoric is not comparable. This is because its subject matter-logos or the entirety of praxis itself-is not a determinate unity that can be broken into parts and then recombined via a set of rules. Instead, it is a series of contingent events. Therefore, the appropriate response to praxis requires "creativity," since the good speaker must invent novel responses to the many unpredictable occasions and subjects he faces:
OUTO? slvai SoKBt TEXVLKwraro'!, 6? Tts av dfio)? pev kByrj riov TTpaypdTwv, fiTjSEV 8E TMV avTOjv T019 oiXXot? EvpicTKBiv hvvrjTai.
(This speaker seems to be the most skiUful [technikotatos] who speaks in a way that is worthy of his subject and is able to discover a unique way of approaching the subject.) ( §12)
The use of technikotatos here is stiiking, because it echoes the phrase tetagmenen technen used earUer in the first sentence of §12. Isocrates objects to those sophists (and perhaps to Plato) who describe their subject matter as analogous to the fixity of correct speUing, and he clearly denies having such a techne. But he also thinks it is possible for someone to become (or at least to seem to become) ''most skillful" in speaking.
Is this a contiadiction? If not, it is either because being technikotatos does not require possessing a techne, or because Isocrates beUeves his own subject is a techne, but not a fixed one. Isocrates is largely sUent about what sort of knowledge he has in mind here. Therefore, aU we can safely infer so far is negative: teaching a student how to become most skillful in rhetoric is not a mechanical process analogous to teaching correct spelling. Instead, because a good speech responds to the occasion and is novel, and because good orators intervene into a course of unpredictable events, they must be sensitive and flexible enough to respond weU to the contingencies and particularities of the moment. And there are no hard and fast rules on how to do this. The question is, can this capacity be taught, and if so, how?
After criticizing his competitors' teaching methods and their choice of an inappropriate paradigm on which to model their knowledge, Isocrates explains his own conception of rhetorical By acknowledging that there are those who, by virtue of their natural talent, succeed in speech-making, Isocrates seems to degrade the value of his own pedagogical prowess. This may seem self-defeating, especially in a work that is often thought to be a "prospectus" for his own school.^ Indeed, Isocrates himself here presents what we have seen is a standard objection to rhetoric's claim to being a techne, namely that (to quote Sextus Empiricus again) "it is possible to make a speech quite successfully and well without having studied rhetoric. . . . Hence, rhetoric is not a techne."
Immediately following such a disavowal, however, comes a strong positive claim: rhetorical education does make students more "skillful. "^^ More specifically, it can improve those who have good natures by systematically organizing what they intuitively and hence unreliably know. This would make Isocrates the teacher valuable indeed.
'^See Jaeger, Paideia, 3:55. '^Note that, unlike the earlier passage, here Isocrates doesn't say "seem to be." There is, however, another disavowal: even the best teacher cannot transform a student with a poor nature into a good debater or speech-maker. And then comes yet another antithetical response: with some education even such poor students can at least improve. Negation is followed by affirmation in an almost stiophic/antistrophic fashion, and it becomes ambiguous what exact claim Isocrates the teacher of rhetoric is making.
Isocrates does grant that some portion of his educational program is "fixed" and "stable." (t>T) It is not clear what "forms" means in this passage. Jaeger suggests "basic forms of orator," Taylor "Gorgianic figures," Hubbell "commonplace arguments," and Lidov "thought elements."^* Fortunately, it is not necessary here to decide this issue. What is sufficient for our purpose is to note that Isocrates asserts that some dimension of his curriculum is "fixed," and so is systematically, even mechanically, teachable. Not surprisingly, however, he foUows this assertion with a disavowal: (On the other hand, to choose [from the forms] those which should be chosen for each subject and to arrange and order [taxai] them properly, and furthermore not to miss the occasion [kairos] but appropriately to adorn the whole speech with striking thoughts and to clothe it in flowing and melodious phrases -these require much practice and are the work of a manly and intuitive mind.) ( §16- §17)
To summarize: on the one hand, it is not difficult for the student to receive the fixed portion of knowledge Isocrates professes ''Joel Lidov summarizes this material in "The Meaning of IDEA in Isocrates," La parola del passato, 38 (1983), 273-87. 152 RHETORICA succeed. Indeed, his is a school reshricted only to the talented few who receive years of personal instiuction in which the teacher becomes a "paradigm" (paradeigma, §18) who makes a lasting impression upon the student. ^^ In short, the vacUlating form of Isocrates' argument mirrors its content. The content: political life is composed of contingent moments. The form: an antithetical response to the question, is rhetoric a techne? This mirroring reflects the coherence of the rhetorical project. In other words, precisely because of its conception of political Ufe/logos, the Isocratean response is appropriate, i.e., its form is adequate to its content. As a result, the Socratic/Sextean critique of rhetoric, which is based precisely on a tetagmene model of techne, misses the mark.
In sum, in Against the Sophists, Isocrates effectively makes a dual claim: first, that he has something to teach, a kind of knowledge for which he can properly charge tuition. Second, his curriculum should not be measured against the standard of orthography. His teaching methods are not appropriate for every student, only for those naturaUy talented, and he admits the role that chance and human nature play in his students' achievements. Consequently, he cannot translate his curriculum into the form of a tetagmene techne. But this does not compromise the integrity of his role as teacher. In fact, by making this series of negative claims he distances himself from his sophistic coUeagues, the ones who make the lofty promises they cannot keep.^'
Isocrates' response to ttie question of whether rhetoric is a techne is thus fundamentally simUar to Quintilian's. When Quintilian begins his discussion he says this: Ac me dubitasse confiteor, an hanc partem quaestiorus tiactandam putarem; nam quis est adeo non ab eruditione modo sed a sensu remotus hominis, ut fabricandi quidem et texendi et e luto vasa ducendi artem putet, rhetoricen autem, maximum ac pulcherrimum . opus, in tam sublime fastigium existimet sine arte veiiisse?
(Indeed, I wiU confess that I had doubts as to whether I should discuss this inquiry [is rhetoric an art?], for there is no one, I wiU not say so unlearned, but so devoid of ordinary sense, as to hold that 38See Antidosis 87-88. ''Michael Cahn, in "Reading Rhetoric Rhetorically," Rhetorica, 7 (1989) , 126-39, argues that Isocrates' denial of the technical status of rhetoric is itself a strategy by which to promote his own educational program. 153 buUding, weaving or moulding vessels from clay are arts, and at the same time to consider that rhetoric . . . has reached such a lofty eminence without the assistance of art.) (II.xvu.3) That someone can learn rhetoric, and that it is a subject worth paying for, seem obvious. But what exactly is the subject matter of rhetoric? The answer Quintilian offers is, anything that can be placed before the orator as a subject of a speech. In defense of this assertion he states that the subject of rhetoric is not unlimited, only manifold. In fact, however, what the orator should know is what to study and when, what is relevant and what is not. In short, he should know how to respond appropriately to the kairos. And this unique sensitivity-as Isocrates knows well-is something that cannot be taught-at least not in a techrucal or formal fashion.
For Isocrates, then, rhetoric is and is not a techne. For QuintiUan, it is manifestly an art, but one which makes the extiaordinary claim to be able to talk about everything. As such, and even if he does not make this point explicit, for QuintUian, too, rhetoric is and is not an art. And this is because of the nature of its subject matter.
V
The question of whether rhetoric is an art has had a long and tenacious Ufe. It was debated continuously throughout antiquity, from Plato's Gorgias and Isocrates' Against the Sophists, through the works of Cicero, QuintUian, Philodemus, and Sextus Empiricus. It was satirized by Lucian and discussed at great length by Aristides.*" Recently it was the subject of a very nice article by Jonathan Barnes and a polemic by Brian Vickers. But this question has more than staying power, for within it lies a fundamental issue: Can human Ufe, can the realm of politics and pubhc speeches, of praxis and logos, be rendered fixed and stable? Is there anything in this world of human affairs that can be counted upon, that can be known with reUabiUty? Is the poUtical world in any way analogous to the alphabet, whose subject matter is the paradigm of determinacy?
•""See Lucian, "The Parasite," and Aristides, "In Defence of Oratory." Both are available in the Loeb Classical Library.
RHETORICA
When Socrates says rhetoric is not a techne, he does so because of his conception of techne as a determinate body of knowledge, and what he takes to be the indeterminate subject matter of rhetoric. When Sextus Empiricus reports the standard objections levelled against rhetoric, it becomes clear they all derive from this basic Socratic objection. There is something about the effort of talking (and pleasing) everyone, something about the the real poUtical world, that cannot, it seems, be rendered rigorously, rigidly technical.
In an important sense, the rhetorician agrees. Isocrates hedges on the techne question, saying both yes and no. QuintiUan follows suit by describing the subject matter of rhetoric as multiplex but not infinita. The achievement of the rhetoricians is their abUity to harmonize two potentially discordant themes. On the one hand, they acknowledge the contingent flow of occasions, and the consequent fact that practical knowledge, knowledge of how to speak well, is not an art, not a techne (or, at least, not a tetagmene techne, i.e., one with a determinate subject matter). On the other hand, yes, indeed, rhetoric is a weU-formed and real subject, one that can be packaged, paid for, and delivered.
The fundamental issue lurking behind the question should now be clear. Do we have access to stable values and standards? Is there something to be known that can regulate our poUtical Uves? If so, what sort of knowledge would this be? If so, should a hierarchy be drawn in which the person having that knowledge is to be situated at the top and perhaps even granted poUtical rule? If not, then should the question of rule be decided by pubhc debate in a democratic forum? These are among the most basic and enduring questions concerning our moral and poUtical lives. And they are latent in the apparently innocuous query: Is rhetoric an art?
